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Affirming Art: Heidegger and the Sense of a Beginning 
 
Gary Peters  
York St John University 
 
This essay offers a philosophical perspective that, in breaking with both the open and surreptitious dialectical 
method  still  so  prominent  in  academic  discourse,  follows  Heidegger  in  trying  to  conceive  of  a  radically 
non-dialectical manner of approaching affirmation, negation, and neutrality. As with Heidegger, this is attempted 
through a turn towards art and the “emancipated contingency” that characterizes much creative production. In 
contrast to action and production within the knowledge economy, the creation of the artwork concerns a knowing of 
unknowingness (described by Maurice Blanchot as the neutral) that demands a rethink of action in relation to truth 
and errancy. Indeed, the very working of the work of art is conceived here as a truth that is precisely “set to work” 
(Heidegger) by errancy. Through a consideration of the essential difference between choice and decision and the 
different “beginning” of art that this suggests, the essay concludes with some reflections of the theme of art’s 
fascination and the and the affirmation of the unknown. 
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1. The Power of No 
 
I am the one who has to decide what they should ultimately look like (the making of pictures consists of a 
large number of yes and no decisions and a yes decision at the end) (Gerhard Richter 1992, 1047). 
But we know the beginning, the other one, we know it by questioning, we stay in the leap ahead of any yes 
or no (Heidegger 2006, 5). 
There is a virility attached to the negative: “the power of no.” Because it is hard to say “no,” hardness 
itself, a certain musculation of the mind, becomes associated with the ability to resist, deny, and negate the 
affirmatory trajectory of another: And the life of mind, in its very remoteness from the physical, is one 
constantly on the lookout for equivalents to the physicality it so singularly lacks. 
The “power of no” is double, not only does it stop the “yes” in its tracks but at the same time it 
surreptitiously creates the very desire that fuels the affirmative spirit it is so keen to derail. In other words, the 
“no” itself creates the “yes” that it must say “no” to, thereby augmenting its negative potency in a dialectical 
escalation that forever ties the affirmative to its own denial. 
Of course, this negative dialectics can itself be negated by the affirmation of affirmation seen at work in 
the numerous guises of post-structuralist thinking, the classic example being Deleuze’s famous anti-Hegelian 
version of Nietzsche. But, to say “no” to no (even in the name of affirmation) is still to say “no,” is still to play 
(or be played by) the Hegelian game. This undoubtedly gives affirmation a certain physicality too, but at what 
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price?  The gross  misappropriation of Nietzsche’s Ubermensch would be just one example, as would the 
confusion of his will-to-power with power itself and the virility that would supposedly come with that. Deleuze 
(1994) recognizes this when he writes: “those whom Nietzsche calls masters are certainly powerful men, but 
not men of power, since power is in the gift of the values of the day” (54). 
Would it be possible to prise affirmation away from the values of the day, not only from the virility of the 
negative, but also, by implication, from the reflected virility of the positive too? The truly affirmative power 
necessary to “re-evaluate all values” cannot itself be valued as a positive or negative force within the existing 
value system without collapsing back into the very dialectic it seeks to overcome. For this reason we must be 
constantly wary of collapsing the affirmative and the positive: they are different. Just as Nietzsche’s task is to 
think the will-to-power outside of existing power relations, so the challenge here is to try and say “yes” not 
only to “yes,” and not only to “no,” but also to “yes,” “no,” and “don’t know” as well; a triple affirmation that 
unlike the speculative substantiation that is associated with the Hegelian negation of negation, constantly 
throws us back to a beginning or origin that is “ahead of” the secondary “yes/no” of dialectics. 
 
2. The Power of Yes 
 
When the artist Gerhard Richter describes the production of the artwork as “a large number of yes and no 
decisions and a yes decision at the end,” he is neither confirming, agreeing nor accepting, and he is certainly 
not expressing anything. The final “yes” simply says, following the farmer in the movie Babe: “That’ll do pig;” 
“There you are;” “So be it;” and “Voila!” 
Richter’s final affirmation—the artist’s “yes”––is not about the placing of an aesthetic object in space, but, 
rather, the enactment of what Derrida describes as a process of “espacement” (Derrida 1978, 237) the opening 
of, or spacing of space. The final “yes” does not negate all the “nos” that preceded it, on the contrary they are 
all held in abeyance, present as the prior work of erasure that marks the space that is affirmed. But this does not 
constitute an ultimate affirmation of negation because erasure and negation are not synonymous terms. As brute 
negativity, negation produces absence; as speculative dialectics, negation produces presence; erasure produces 
neither absence nor presence, but, rather, the presence of absence. 
Like deletion on a computer where, prior to defragmentation (a fascistic act), discarded information 
remains present as an absence that interrupts, opens up and slows down the closed uninterrupted space that 
processors crave, so erasure articulates rather than negates spaces, forms, structures, and articulation is neither 
negative nor positive, it is neutral. Indeed, it is the affirmation of neutrality, a “yes” beyond the “yes-no” of 
positivism and dialectics respectively. It is for this reason that the aesthetic chiasmus Richter (1992) describes, 
the criss-crossing between “yes” and “no,” is in reality a double affirmation––a “yes”––that brings the work 
into being. That is to say, the “no” of aesthetic judgement as it is exercised within the creative process is really 
a “yes” in that each mark erased, every possibility rejected, is not thereby destroyed but put to one side for 
future reference, ready to tempt the artist again. And there is temptation here, not least because so much of what 
is rejected is, in truth, extraordinarily attractive to the artist, often to the detriment of the artwork if the all 
important “no” cannot be uttered. As such then, the “no” of aesthetic judgement should not be understood in 
terms of negation but, rather as the necessary renunciation required to produce a work. Indeed, and this is the 
predicament, so much of what the artist wants has to be renounced before the artwork can be produced, and it is 
this desire for and attraction to the very things that would damage the work that should remind us that for every 
“no” there exists a prior “yes” that needs to be cast aside before it is too late. Notwithstanding his famous 
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critique, it was this, the power of renunciation that Adorno (1973) considered to be Stravinsky’s great artistic 
strength. “Stravinsky’s imitators remained far behind their model, because they did not possess his power of 
renunciation, that perverse joy in self-denial” (Adorno 1973, 153). 
Every act of renunciation leaves a space in the work that, to repeat, takes on presence as an absence that 
continues to have force both as the trace of aesthetic judgement and creative erring, and as an intensity 
associated  with  the  severity  necessary  to  delete  that  which  is  so  desirable.  Referring  to  Valéry,  Derrida 
describes this present absence as a “crinkling” of the page. He writes in Margins of Philosophy: 
 
But—I mark(s) the division—by taking a different turn, by observing from an excentric place the logic of Valéry’s aversion, 
why not ask ourselves about another outside, about the sources set aside, the sources that Valéry could get a glimpse of 
only on the bias, as in a brief, or rather foreshortened, mirroring, just the time to recognise or reflect himself and 
immediately to turn away—quickly, decidedly, furtively too, like an about-face to be described according to the gesture of 
Narcissus. We will analyse this turning away only where it has left marks within Valéry’s textual system, as a regular 
crinkling of every page. (Derrida 1982, 275) 
 
In truth, the artist’s “nos” are secretly “yeses” because the errancy of the creative process (the false paths, 
the wrong turns, the dead ends) is neither false nor wrong, and it is certainly not dead. Indeed, the very 
lifeblood  of  the  artwork  flows  through  the  detours  and  diversions  that,  even  though  they  are  erased, 
nevertheless remain responsible for making the work become what it becomes. 
Niklas Luhmann (2000) observes that “rejection ‘potentializes’ by reproducing the rejected as possibility” 
(33), and it is the fact that every “no” is potentially a “yes” which allows possibility to incessantly interrupt the 
premature foreclosure of the artwork. But this is more than just an aesthetic version of “versioning,” to stay 
with the language of computers and hypertext; it is not a question of simply retaining earlier iterations of the 
same work in a virtual archive of variations where the theme remains intact, but of acknowledging that the 
artwork always has the potential to be other than it is. In other words, possibility here refers not to the versions 
but the archive itself and the (neutral) space between one potential archive and another. Nor is it a question of 
going back to all those “nos” in order to re-read them as potential “yeses” so as to endlessly augment and enrich 
the artist’s oeuvre through a feverish obsession with every preliminary sketch, every discarded fragment, every 
erased inscription, all of which are forced to speak of a lost origin, a beckoning têlos, and the overpowering 
desire for absolute knowledge. On the contrary, as Kafka’s Diaries illustrate so eloquently, every “yes” and 
subsequent “no,” all of the beginnings and endings that mark out this fragmentary space of the work, are 
nothing but detours; not versions but diversions that could never offer a meaningful contextualisation for a 
“final”  work  (the  last  “yes”).  Instead  one  is  witness  to  a  process  of  infinite  re-textualisation  where, 
Deleuzian-fashion, it is precisely the repetition of the “yes”/“no” infinite that produces difference, not different 
versions of the same work (mere “diversity”) (Deleuze 1994, 222). But the same difference that is irreducible to 
one work or another. 
But, to be clear, while art (perhaps uniquely) allows the emancipation of contingency and the consequent 
affirmation of errancy, erring itself is not accorded any positive or negative value. In art, erring is completely 
neutral as is the desire for the errancy and the act of erasure that removes its trace, if only temporarily. It is the 
affirmation of this neutrality that positions the “yes” of productive aesthetic judgement outside of the “yes-no” 
nexus to be found in the twin (and entwined) hegemonies of the knowledge economy and the politico-ethical 
community; something that the almost all-pervasive attempt within critical theory to politicise the aesthetic 
fights hard against, not necessarily without reason: the neutrality of art is dubious. 
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3. The Neutral 
 
Neutrality refuses all affiliation. If, as one might say with Walter Benjamin, friendship does not reduce 
distance but, rather, brings that distance to life (Josopovici 1987, 62); then the neutral—friend to none—offers 
no such easy access to the spaces between one point and another. In a world of entrenchments, of positions, 
camps,  beliefs,  and  conviction,  where  even  the  most  unfriendly  acts  still  assume  and  contribute  to  the 
live-liness of an unrealised filiation, neutrality occupies an outside that—neither friendly nor unfriendly—is 
easy to eye with suspicion. A-filiation (to coin a term) rather than non-affiliation (which still assumes a 
dialectic of resistance) is, perhaps, one way of describing this alterity. Without attraction or revulsion, such 
neutrality introduces into the production of an artwork the exigency that at each and every moment the 
expanding or contracting possibilities that present themselves are each given full and equal attention regardless 
of the consequences for the swift and smooth integration necessary for achievement of a “work.” It is this, the 
radical equality of neutrality, which is responsible for errancy, the introduction of a logic or method of erasure 
and, as with the fragmentation of a computer hard drive, the slowing down of the work of the work of art. 
Maurice Blanchot (1982) identifies this delay at the heart of Kafka’s work, where the very desire for continuity 
creates endless discontinuity and eternal transformation. 
 
For if patience, exactitude, and cold mastery are qualities indispensible for not getting lost when nothing subsists that one 
could hold onto, patience, exactitude, and cold mastery are also faults which, dividing difficulties and stretching them out 
indefinitely, may well retard the shipwreck, but surely retard deliverance, by ceaselessly transforming the infinite into the 
indefinite. In the same way it is measure which, in the work, prevents the limitless from ever being achieved. (Maurice 
Blanchot 1982, 82) 
 
To say “yes” (or at least the temptation to say “yes”) to every possibility before either erasing it with a 
subsequent “no,” or, alternatively, allowing it to stand is the movement of a particular delay that separates art so 
radically from all of the extra-aesthetic contexts and contextualisations that would so like to speed the artwork 
to the goals of their choosing. Emmanuel Levinas (1989) captures something of this in his review of Michel 
Leiris’s Biffures when he reminds us of the proximity of biffure (erasure) and bifur (bifurcation). 
 
Bifurcations—since sensations, words and memories continually turn a train of thought from the path it seemed to be 
taking towards some unexpected direction; erasures—since the univocal meaning of each element is continually corrected 
and altered. But in these bifurcations and erasures Leiris is less concerned to go down the new paths opened up or to latch 
onto the corrected meaning than he is to capture thought at that special moment when it turns into something other than 
itself….The primordial status of the notion of erasure affirms the simultaneity of multiplicity… [this] the ambiguity of 
erasures forms a space. (Levinas 1989, 145-146) 
 
“Forms a space,” this is the point: the logic of erasure both opens a space and gives it form—to repeat, a 
mode of articulation. This articulation is the product of a series of “yeses” and “nos” that are multiplicitous not 
only as a continuum of possibilities but also as a simultaneity that pluralises (or potentializes) the artwork at 
every moment, with all of the contingency each moment brings. If, as Levi nas claims here, “thought is 
originally erasure” (Levinas 1989, 146), this is not only because, as he suggests, always concealed within such 
thought is the “presence of one idea in another” (Levinas 1989, 146), but also the fact that the contingency of 
what is concealed and what is not at such moments of bifurcation vanishes into each univocal meaning: but the 
question remains—why this rather than that? 
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4. The Emancipation of Contingency 
 
So, it would seem that the reason for art’s resistance to the teleological logic of instrumentalism in all of its 
different  forms  is  not,  contrary  to  the  now  deeply  unfashionable  thrust  of  late  modernism,  due  to  an 
aestheticism intent upon protecting the pure essence of the work from anything outside of its own “truth,” but, 
rather, a product of the contingency that, as Luhmann (2000) expresses it, is emancipated by art. 
 
The art system realizes society in its own realm as an exemplary case. It shows things as they are […] fies a situation in 
which the future, no longer guaranteed by the past, has become unpredictable. Operative closure, the emancipation of 
contingency,  self-organization,  poly-contexturality,  the  hyper  complexity  of  self-descriptions,  or,  simpler  and  less 
accurately formulated, pluralism, relativism, historicism—all these trends offer no more than different cross sections of the 
structural fate of modernity. By suffering its own condition, art shows that’s just how it is. (Luhmann 2000, 309) 
 
But, quite apart from how things are, art’s “suffering” of its own contingency needs to be viewed in a more 
affirmative light––the intention here––which, if we continue with Blanchot, begins to suggest that the affirmative 
dimension of art might be understood as an affirmation of the unknown, a “yes” to the “don’t know.” 
 
The unknown is neutral, a neuter […] let us propose that in research—where poetry and thought affirm themselves in the 
space that is proper to them, separable, inseparable—the unknown is at stake; on condition, however, that it be explicitly 
stated that this research relates to the unknown as unknown [….] In other words, we are supposing a relation in which the 
unknown would be affirmed, made manifest, even exhibited: disclosed—and under what aspect?—precisely in that which 
keeps it unknown. (Blanchot 1991, 300). 
 
As  described  here,  art  becomes  a  form  of  research,  albeit  one  completely  uncoupled  from  the 
will-to-knowledge. But the crucial question raised by this passage is the following: if neutrality can be affirmed 
and, more to the point, if this affirmation is of the order of manifestation, exhibition, and disclosure as Blanchot 
suggests, then what form or forms does this affirmation take artistically and, more importantly, how are these 
forms arrived at? 
First of all, it is clear that the affirmation of the unknown as unknown can only take place within the 
known, as a gap, space or erasure; anything else would be wantonly obscure or nonsensical. Thus, the neutral 
does not by any means inhabit an exclusive and refined aesthetic metaphysically beyond the familiar forms of 
art practice; on the contrary, its real force can be felt within artworks across the board, from the most original to 
the most predictable (even clichéd) examples of creative practice. The unknown is not beneath, behind or 
secreted within the work, the unknown is the work to the extent that it turned out like this rather than 
that—why? It is this, the contingency of aesthetic judgements when confronted by the indefinite, but also the 
equalised space of possibility presented by the neutral that introduces the unknown into the known. We know 
the work—there it is—but we don’t know how or why the artist came to say the final “yes” to this rather than a 
different work. And not only do we know that we don’t know, but we know that we cannot know because the 
contingency of each affirmation or renunciation renders the productive process incomprehensible, the artist’s 
claims  of  an  immanent  necessity  notwithstanding.  But,  to  say  again,  this  incomprehensibility  is  not  a 
mystification but, rather, the very articulation of the work itself as it emerges out of the logic of erasure that 
holds the alterity of the “this rather than that” in place or in the space between one possibility and another. And 
it is because erasure is always a contingent aesthetic act that this space between the “yes” and the “no,” what’s 
in or out, is always shifting and thus impossible to predict or reduce to the known. 
The aesthetic affirmation described here, the affirmation required for a work to emerge, is not, then, 
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simply a “yes.” As an inceptual rather than a confirmational or expressive enunciation, such a “yes” is, in 
reality, compound: a “yes,” “no,” “don’t know,” and the affirmation of all three elements. The co-presence of 
the positive, negative and the neutral (the marked, the unmarked/erased and the contingent space between them) 
and the affirmation of this concatenation is what distinguishes art from its contexts, where the dialectics of 
“yes-no” reign supreme. In a sense, art goes beyond dialectics, as long as this is understood in the Nietzschean 
sense as a going back before (genealogically) and/or beneath (archaeologically) the post-tragic introduction of 
the dialectic by Socrates. Indeed, to go further, Heidegger would want to press on beyond the existential 
tragedy of the pre-dialectical into an ontological space that, in its inhuman neutrality, eventually brings him 
back to art. To be sure, Heidegger describes what he calls this “other beginning” (the beginning beyond the 
initiation of dialectical thinking) in terms of negation, but he has a characteristically complex grasp on this term, 
one that brings it much closer to the affirmation of the neutral being considered here. What is more, as will 
become apparent, the movement of his thought within the “yes,” “no,” and the neutral ultimately affirms all 
three in its desire to resist what he considers to be the ontological superficiality of the dialectic. 
So, in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Heidegger (1999) gives priority to the “no,” but this 
is a long way away from any familiar sense of disapproval or rejection, let alone the more speculative “no” of 
dialectical thinking proper. But, interestingly, his defence of the “no” is also accompanied by an implicit 
re-evaluation of the “yes,” one that likewise prises it away from the dialectic of approval and disapproval. 
 
How few understand––and how rarely those who understand grasp––“negation”. One immediately sees in it only rejection, 
putting aside, degrading, and even destroying. Not only are these forms of negation often pretentious, they also most 
immediately encourage the common idea of “no”. Thus the thought of the possibility that negation could perhaps have a 
still deeper being than “yes” is left out––especially since one quickly also takes “yes”, in the sense of any kind of approval, 
as superficially as the “no”. 
But is approving and rejecting in the domain of representing and of representing “evaluation” the only form of yes and no? 
Is that domain after all the only and essential domain, or is it rather like correctness, derived from a more originary truth? 
And in the end is not the “yes and no” an essential possession of being itself––and the “no” even more originarily than the 
“yes”? (Heidegger 1999, 125). 
 
More originary than the “yes” perhaps, but the Heideggerian “no” is, nonetheless, itself fundamentally 
affirmative––a “no” that’s really a “yes”––(like the artist’s). As he continues: “the ‘no’ is the great leap-off by 
which the t/here in Da-sein is leaped into: the leap-off that […] ‘affirms’ that from which it leaps off […]” 
(Heidegger 1999, 125). 
 
5. The Two Beginnings 
 
Transposing this way of thinking into the domain of aesthetic production rather than (with Heidegger) the 
unconcealing of Being resonates well with much of the above. What is most useful is the way in which 
Heidegger works with the idea of two beginnings: the “first beginning” and the “other beginning.” Artworks, 
like everything else, begin but, unlike everything else, artworks problematise the beginning. So, yes, they begin 
but they might not, or if they do, why like this rather than that? But not only does art problematise the 
beginning, it also dramatises it. Look! Something from nothing! Look! The marking of an unmarked space! But 
the problem (and the drama) for the artist is not just the beginning but the continuation of the artwork. And, in a 
sense, the dominant perception of (and attraction to) art revolves around the oft-celebrated struggle with 
continuation. But this raises another problem: how to continue without obscuring or, indeed, negating the 
beginning; how to keep the work beginning. 
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For Heidegger, origination does not simply occur at the beginning of the artwork but throughout its 
continuation understood as a perpetual origination––the eternal recurrence of the beginning. This is an idea 
Heidegger shares with Walter Benjamin (1985) who describes the origin thus: “the term origin is not intended 
to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from 
the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it 
swallows the material involved in the process of its genesis” (45). 
It is within this context––the becoming of aesthetic prduction––that Heidegger’s notion of two beginnings 
begins to make sense, one that also helps clarify the intrmingling of the “yes,” “no,” and “don’t know” in art 
practice. 
Gerhard Richter speaks of a series of “yes” and “no” judgements familiar to any artist, but if we place this 
process within the Heideggerian frame proposed here then the “no’s” take on a different significance. The “no” 
at issue here is does not negate but, as Heidegger puts it, “repels” the “first beginning” which, once begun, 
constitutes the past of the work as a “still-going-along-with” that needs to be interrupted. Put another way, the 
“first beginning” of the work, its origin [Ursprung], demands a continuation that is forever in danger of 
concealing, what Heidegger would see as, the originary unconcealment of the creative act. Nevertheless, it is 
still absolutely essential that this “first beginning” be affirmed otherwise there would be no work at all, even if 
this affirmation is articulated as a “leaping-off” that repels or is repelled by the descent of the beginning into its 
continuation. Saying “no” to the “first beginning” of the work then is necessary for the work to become a work: 
it is the working of the work understood as its becoming. Benjamin (1985) understands this in rhythmic terms, 
continuing the above passage: “that which is original is never revealed in the naked and the manifest existence 
of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight” (45). 
It is precisely that, the “dual insight” required to bring into view the “first” and the “other” beginning, that 
characterises  Heidegger’s  way  of  thinking  and  which  requires  that  negation  and  affirmation  are  thought 
together as the pulse of unconcealment/concealment that represents (for him) the working of the work. 
Thought thus, and to reiterate, the negativity of the originary “no” is not conceived in terms of negation 
but, rather, as the affirmation of repulsion—a form or erasure that repels rather than destroys: renunciation. 
Again to reiterate, placing something under erasure should not be confused with the expression of disapproval 
any more than affirmation should be indicative of approval. For Heidegger, the “yes” and “no” have nothing to 
do with either, a fact that might usefully be recalled when considering Richter’s remarks. As Heidegger (2006) 
explains in his Mindfulness: 
 
Affirming and approving are not the same…. 
Affirming refers to decisions that are not yet-fulfilled, and have to be created for the first time. 
Approvals are easy to bear and there is a multitude of what is to be approved. 
Given their actual futurity, the affirming ones remain necessarily unrecognized and strange even among the likes of 
themselves…. 
The approving ones lie because first they must lie to themselves, insofar as their approving is passed off as affirming, 
passed off as the freeness unto being-free, which is simply what they must evade. 
Affirming means “saying yes” to the nihilating of the ab-ground; it means taking over a decision. (99-100) 
 
Like the famous song––“Yes, We Have No Bananas”––the co-presence of affirmation and negation is not 
dialectically resolved but announced as an affirmation of negation that, in Heidegger’s sense, allows the work 
to leap into its own becoming. The question remains however, if the originary “no” of the “first beginning” 
leaps away from that which is affirmed and repelled at the same time, then who or what decides on the 
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direction of this leap into openness of the “other beginning”? If affirming does refer to “decisions that are not 
yet-fulfilled, and have to be created for the first time,” then how are these decisions arrived at, how and why is 
one leap preferred above another? Why does Richter, like the rest of us, sometimes say “yes” and sometimes 
say “no”? Uncoupled from right and wrong, the aesthetic decisions that keep the artwork working are difficult 
to ground. As already suggested, if artworks represent the “emancipation of contingency,” then the choice of 
one mark rather than another, as a move within the indefinite detour of errancy, will always be subject to 
revision. Richter claims that he ultimately decides, but is the exercise of choice the same thing as making a 
decision?  Put another  way;  are  the  “yeses”  and/or  “nos” of  the work’s becoming,  choices or  decisions? 
Heidegger (1999) is in no doubt: “What is decision at all? Not choice. Choosing always involves only what is 
pregiven and can be taken or rejected. Decision here means grounding and creating, disposing in advance and 
beyond oneself or giving up and losing” (69). 
 
6. Choice and Decision 
 
Clearly, making an artwork involves a series of choices. While the “unmarked space” might indeed be 
unmarked by the artist at the beginning of the work. The first mark and the subsequent marks of the work’s 
continuation are arrived at (whether “spontaneously” or after much deliberation) through a series of choices 
that inevitably draw upon the available patterns of marking that silently/invisibly inhabit the unmarked as an 
insistent possibility. In theory, the work could be anything, but in practice it usually turns out pretty much as 
one would expect––which, of course, includes the expectation of the unexpected. To this extent then, the 
“yeses”  and  “nos”  of  the  work’s  production  can  indeed  be  conceived  as  the  operation  of  choice,  the 
criss-crossing of aesthetic judgement within the parameters of the “pregiven.” Decision, on the other hand, as 
the word suggests (de-cision), describes a cutting, a cutting away from what is there as the initiation of a task to 
create another beginning and another time-space “ahead of yes and no.” “The decision must create that 
time-space, the site for the essential moments, where the most serious mindfulness, along with the most joyful 
mission, grows into a will to found and build” (Heidegger 1999, 68). 
Does decision cut itself free from choice, or does it cut into it, thereby creating another space-time within 
or between the “yes” and “no”, or, as Heidegger describes it Kierkegaardian-fashion: the either-or? It is this 
possibility that raises the issue of neutrality again or “indifference” to use Heidegger’s (1999) language below: 
 
What is own most to decision can only be determined from within and out of its essential swaying. Decision is decision 
between either-or. But that already forestalls what has the character of decision. From where [comes] the either-or? Where 
does this come from, only this or only that? From where [comes] the unavoidability of thus or thus? Is there not a third, 
indifference? (70) 
 
If the artwork is the product of a “yes” or “no,” where it is the emancipated contingency of art that always 
results in aesthetic choices being characterised by what might be described as conviction without knowledge, 
then the betweenness of de-cision suggests a way of outstripping the arbitrariness of a conviction-aesthetics, 
based upon baseless choice, by rooting the unknowingness of art not in the constantly erased space between the 
“yes” and “no”—earlier described as the “rather than”—but, more essentially, in the space erased by the space 
of erasure itself, the space “ahead of” the mutual erasure of “yes” and “no.” 
The indifference of decision is double; it is indifferent to the “pregiven” choices that are all-too-ready-to-hand, 
and it is also in-difference, in a different space-time that decision is, if Heidegger is to be followed, able to 
“found and build.” To the extent that the indifference of decision points towards the more essential in-difference 
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where the “other beginning” can begin, then it throws off its merely aesthetic garb and acquires ontological 
significance as the necessary break not only with the either-or of choice but also with the no less contingent 
binarity of the artist and the artwork. 
For the artist, the emancipated contingency evident in the production of the artwork makes it the perfect 
vehicle for both the articulation and the suffering of the “incomprehensibility” of Being. This results in the 
existential  predicament  of  the  artist  faced  with  the  task  of  producing  an  artwork  without  the  requisite 
knowledge of just how (or even why) to begin. There is a certain ironic knowingness of the unknowingness of 
art  that  allows the  artist  to  nevertheless affirm a  beginning without an  originary and  founding origin to 
“unconceal.” The fact that the artwork began like this rather than that can be explained, no doubt, at the level of 
choice (some artists are very good at explaining their intentions) but as the continuation of the work so often 
demonstrates, without the decisiveness Heidegger speaks of, this continuation either finds itself incapable of 
leaping  away  from  this  “first  beginning,”  or,  alternatively,  becomes  trapped  in  a  proliferation  of  “first 
beginnings” that shatters the unity of the work and its continuity. The former uses the beginning of the work as 
an arbitrary arbiter in the “yes/no” choices that are secreted within the reassuring integrity of the final “yes.” 
The latter swears no allegiance to the contingency of originary moment, engaging instead in a process of 
potentially infinite re-origination that celebrates the incessant “deterritorialization” opened up by the “yeses” 
and “nos” as they play across the surface of the work as flagrant indifference and infidelity. To say again: both 
affirm the “yes,” “no,” and “don’t know” of the artwork––the first secretly, the second openly, but, from a 
Heideggerian perspective, the merely aesthetic or ironic affirmation of indifference is inessential because it is 
only ever exercised within the neutral space between the “yes” and “no” rather than, as Heidegger demands, 
“ahead of any yes or no.” But what would it mean to “leap ahead of any yes and no”? 
When Heidegger speaks of inbetweenness, as he often does, he is speaking not of the space between 
affirmation and negation or, as we have seen, between approval and disapproval, but of a space-time that is 
situated outside rather than within such binaries. Put another way, for him it is not a question of either “yes” or 
“no”, but of a “no” that (in reality) says “yes” to a space-time that has outstripped the oscillatory play of the 
dialectician. As such, the affirmative dimension of Heidegger’s thought is not related to the choice of this or 
that aspect of the given but, rather, to the prior givenness of the given and the giving of that: incessant 
origination. 
While it might be true that Heidegger’s famous anti-aesthetic “turn” towards art is largely indifferent to 
both the artist and the artwork, the fact remains that the issue for us here is the impact of such thinking on the 
task of the artist producing actual artworks. Heidegger, in common with the majority of philosophers, always 
speaks as a receiver of art, the issue here is the production of art within the context of his thought. What would 
aesthetic de-cision look like? How does ontological errancy differ from ironic/aesthetic errancy for the erring 
artist? What exactly is this “other beginning” and can the actual work of the artist realise its inception? In other 
words, can “inceptual thinking” be translated into inceptual action and inceptual production? 
Perhaps  the best place to begin considering this  is alongside  Heidegger  and his  particular mode  of 
reception. As already seen, for him, saying “no” to the “first beginning” as the means by which the leaping-off 
into the “other beginning” is affirmed, is the way in which a fascination with the artist and the artwork is 
repelled. The leaping-off––from the existential to the ontological––amounts, then, to an essential affirmation of 
art. Just as Maurice Blanchot (close to Heidegger here) describes the act of reading a text as a silent “yes,” an 
affirmation prior to (or “ahead of”) any critical approval or disapproval, so the act of writing a text, of 
 
AFFIRMING ART: HEIDEGGER AND THE SENSE OF A BEGINNING                        967 
 
producing an artwork, is itself already an affirmation of art. But what does it mean to affirm art? Indeed, what 
is art if not the artist and his/her work? Stripped of personalities and aesthetic objects, art, in Heidegger’s view, 
represents a particular “style” of inceptual thinking, one that “enacts” the truth by offering it a particular form 
of “shelter.” “Style is the law of enactment of truth in the sense of sheltering in beings. Because art, for example, 
is setting-into-work of truth and because in the work the sheltering comes in itself to stand unto itself, therefore 
style is visible, although hardly understood––especially in the field of art” (Heidegger 1999, 48). 
 
7. Truth and the Work of Art 
 
For Heidegger art is work, not the artwork but the work of art, one might say the working of the work. Nor 
should this work be confused with the labor of the artist whose personal style and private “truths” are secondary 
issues of interest only to art historians, biographers, connoisseurs, and “fans” and themselves. No, the work of 
art is, in truth, something essentially unaesthetic in nature, indeed, something in truth. But truth is not that 
which can simply be known as true. Truth is not known but enacted, is set to work neither as the content of the 
artwork  nor  the  intentions  of  the  artist  but,  rather,  as  the  inception  of  another  space-time––an  “other 
beginning”––where, as the notion of “shelter” implies, truth is protected and preserved but also concealed. As 
Heidegger thinks it, “style” does not refer to the surface variety of aesthetic forms but to the more essential 
visibility of the work of sheltering itself (visibility being understood as that which outstrips visuality: the poetic 
word, the musical phrase can similarly render the work of truth’s sheltering visible). In this regard, it is not a 
question of identifying different aesthetic styles, but of identifying art as that unique style which renders visible 
truth’s invisibility alongside those other styles (philosophy, science, and religion) that do not. This clearly owes 
a great deal to Hegel’s aesthetics where art represents the phenomenological moment of Spirit’s self-recognition 
as appearance but, surface similarities notwithstanding, it is here that one also witnesses the fundamental divide 
between Hegel’s dialectic of Spirit and Heidegger’s ontology of Being. The former offers up a teleological 
narrative that plots the historical course of misrecognition and unknowing from the viewpoint of an absolute 
knowledge that is arrived at through the work of the negative; the latter, on the contrary, presents us with an 
ecstatic non-narratable, non-dialectical, and non-teleological encounter with historicity that places truth outside 
of knowledge (absolute or not) in a “zone” of knowing unknowingness (unconcealing/concealment) that is 
affirmed. Everything in Hegel points towards the end of history, where the work of negation ceases. Everything 
in Heidegger points towards the beginning (both “first” and “other”) and the work of affirmation that, as the 
motor of origination/re-origination, never ceases. 
 
8. Why Art? 
 
So, to ask the question again, an illegitimate question no doubt given its merely existential perspective: 
what impact does or could such thinking have on the nature of art practice and our understanding of its more 
essential significance? Perhaps one way of answering this is to suggest that it changes the register of the earlier 
question: why this rather than that? At the level of choice and the “yes/no” of the artist, the answer merely 
confirms the emancipated contingency of the aesthetic process and the unknown space between this “yes” and 
“no,” but at the ontological level the question might be rephrased as: why art rather than philosophy or religion 
or politics or science? To this might then be added the subsidiary questions: why be an artist rather than a 
philosopher or a priest? Why make artworks rather than invent concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 5ff) or 
preach sermons? And, if we want to follow Heidegger further, we will very quickly have to ask: why “why?” 
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rather than “how?” or “what?”? “And yet it is necessary to know that although in the course of that history the 
‘why-question’ has taken on the appearance of the deepest and most extreme question, the ‘why-question’ is not 
an originary question at all, but rather remains trapped in the domain of explaining beings” (Heidegger 243). 
Why art? Prior to committing to this or that musical or literary phrase, this or bodily gesture, and this or 
that aesthetic intervention, the artist has already committed to art, the decisive “yes” prior to the contingent 
“yes” and “nos” of aesthetic choice. Heidegger is right, once the why-question is posed it becomes immediately 
apparent that the “what?” and the “how?” must follow close behind. Knowing why something exists too easily 
distracts us from the more essential questions by diverting attention away from ontological errancy towards the 
ontic domain of explanation and explication: the “Why?... Because…” encounter known to every parent. As 
Jacques  Rancière  (1991,  13)  has  argued  so  eloquently  in  The  Ignorant  Schoolmaster, it  is  precisely  the 
“stultification”. He associates with the pedagogical process of explication that, in so confidently invading the 
space of ignorance, effectively destroys not only unknowingness but, more crucially, the affirmation of the 
knowing unknowingness under consideration here. Perhaps the worst parental answer is the best: “Why?”… 
“Just because, that’s it, get over it.” The artist is “thrown” into art, the why-question is largely irrelevant and 
uninteresting, it has happened, what now? In this regard, the shift from the why? to the what? should not refer 
to the shift from “why art?” to “what is art?” (the so-called ontological question that clogs up so many pages of 
so many remarkably un-ontological books on aesthetics), but to the shift from “why art?” to “what does it do?” 
“how?” These questions do not require explanations but descriptions. 
What does art do? And prior to the artist choosing to do this or that, what decides the artist to do art? As 
shown, Heidegger does not offer an explanation of art (or of the artist’s commitment) but describes it as the 
“setting-into-work-of-truth.” But, to be clear, it is not the work of the artist that sets the truth to work, but the 
work of art prior to artist and artwork. Ask an artist why they are artists and they will offer you any number of 
explanations, some convincing, some not. Ask an artist what they do and they will most likely describe in great 
detail and with considerable precision the nature of their work and how they go about it. The question being 
asked here however does not at all fit into this neat duality. “What decided you to become an artist?” does not 
require, as a response, the description of an artwork but, rather, a description of a space that must be entered 
into, the space-time of art itself. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989, 109), very much under the wing of Heidegger, 
describes this space-time as “in-between” and relates it to a notion of “play” that overlaps significantly with the 
latter’s grasp of the work of art. Whatever the merits of this terminological shift from “work” to “play” (it 
serves Gadamer as a means of critiquing what he sees as “subjectivist” aesthetics) the different manner of 
describing the player’s attachment and commitment to the game does offer some insights into how artists 
decide to become artists. Although Gadamer sticks to the concept of choice, it is clear in the following that a 
distinction can be made between choice as de-cision and choice as choice. He writes in Truth and Method: 
 
It seems to me characteristic of human play that it plays something. That means that the structure of movement to which it 
submits has a definite quality which the player “chooses.” First, he expressly separates his playing behaviour from his 
other behaviour by wanting to play. But even within his readiness to play he makes a choice. He chooses this game rather 
than that. (Gadamer 1989, 107) 
 
Clearly, choosing to play, and choosing which game to play are not the same thing. The first “choice” is 
the essential one in that, as de-cision, it both cuts the player away from what Gadamer describes as “his other 
behaviour,” while also cutting open a space within the game thus ensuring that the player is held in place within 
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the subsequent structure of play. It is not, then, just a question of playing the game but, as Gadamer recognises, 
of wanting to play the game, it is this that is de-cisive. But how is this desire to play explained? Like Heidegger, 
Gadamer offers no such explanations but, rather, describes the manner in which the game casts a “spell” over 
the player. 
 
The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the game masters the players…. The 
real subject of the game (this is shown in precisely those experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the 
player but instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game 
itself. (Gadamer 1989, 106) 
 
In order now to import these ideas back into our discussion of the what? and the how? of art, let us just 
remind ourselves that play is only significant for Gadamer to the extent that it relates to the ontology of art. 
“[w]hen we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this means neither the orientation nor even the 
state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the work of art, nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in 
play, but the mode of being of the work of art itself” (Gadamer 1989, 101). 
As with the player, the de-cision to become an artist is not really a choice at all; wanting to do art, its 
attraction, the fascination it exerts, and the spell it casts describe a situation and encounter that leaves little 
room for choice. But how does this enchantment or intoxication come about? What is the fascination of art? 
 
9. Fascination 
 
Perhaps, it is here that we really begin to confront the unknown in art, not at the level of the mark or the 
genre or the form or the ever-expanding possibilities of aesthetic choice that occupy the artist within the 
contingency of any one situation, but at the fundamental level of art itself—why art? But to say again, this is 
not really a why-question but a what-question. It is not a matter of explaining why one might choose art above 
anything else but, rather, of describing what it is about art that is so fascinating. Interestingly, although perhaps 
symptomatic of the philosophical mind and mode, Heidegger is very good at describing what is so fascinating 
about art while, at the same time, not being very good at (or interested in) describing how this fascination 
impacts on the fascinated artist and the artwork. In other words, he is very good at describing a space outside of 
the existential, ontic, and the aesthetic, one that is opened by and demands for its continuance a particular 
“task” of thinking and a particular deployment of language, but he does not devote any time to describing 
exactly how this space is “leapt into”; it remains for artists themselves to describe this. What this signifies is 
that, while the thinker (whether philosopher or artist) can think outside of the aesthetic, the artist, (as the maker 
of work) remains within the aesthetic, albeit a domain now radically transformed by such thinking. It is this 
transformation, the importation of ontological “mindfulness” into the existential, ontic and the aesthetic that is 
ignored in Heidegger’s account, thus leaving us with a way of interpreting art (an ontological hermeneutics) 
rather than of making it. For Heidegger, thinking allows us to re-read art as an opening onto Being; for him the 
encounter with the artwork is always a means to that (endless) end. For the artist, no matter how thought-full, 
the work never vanishes into the task of thinking but always remains, if not as an end, then as a brute reality 
that is transformed by having another space (an “other beginning”) opened-up within it rather than outside it. It 
will take an artist such as Blanchot to recognise the manner in which the “thought from the outside” (Foucault 
1986) is very much on the inside of the artwork and the subsequent aesthetic experience of the artist. The 
unknowingness of art, then, is both outside of it and within it. This will be returned to, but first let us return to 
the “what-question”: what is it about art that decides the artists to become an artist? What is so fascinating? 
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As Gadamer describes it, while the player chooses which game to play, the de-cision to play is not 
something chosen but is, rather, something that is played-out by what Heidegger would call as the very Being 
of the game. In this way of thinking, it is the game that plays the player rather than the player who plays the 
game, and it is precisely this playfulness of play that casts its “spell” and draws the player into game. In spite of 
Heideggers much-used metaphor of the “leap” into the unknown, it is this more processual notion of being 
“drawn” into the unknown that characterises his understanding of the task of thinking (and playing), and it is 
this, the allure of Being, that helps explain the fascination of art. 
Heidegger thinks about art, but like Kant before him, his primary preoccupation is with thinking about 
thinking, art being an essential occasion for such thinking. Thinking is here not rooted in a given body of 
thought, ready and waiting to be thought again, but is understood as a “calling” that both demands commitment 
and,  more  essentially,  a  “heeding”  to  that  which  withdraws  from  the  largely  un-fascinating  domain  of 
knowledge and the known. Just as the player is drawn into the game not as a player but as the played, so 
Heidegger’s thinker is not drawn to thought by the knowledge of what has been thought and is, thus, thinkable, 
but, rather, drawn into thinking by that which is thought provoking, an event of the unknown rather than the 
known. 
 
What must be thought about turns away from man. It withdraws from him. But how can we have the least knowledge of 
something that withdraws from the beginning, how can we even give it a name?... What withdraws from us draws us along 
by its withdrawal…Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are somewhat like migratory birds … caught in the pull of 
what withdraws, attracts us by its withdrawal. And once we, being so attracted, are drawing toward what draws us, our 
essential being already bears the stamp of that “pull.” (Heidegger 1968, 9) 
 
But the question remains: what is it that “pulls” the thinker into the event of thinking? To learn to think, 
for Heidegger (1968, 4), is to learn to give heed to “what there is to think about”, but what is there to think 
about? Needless to say, Heidegger’s own thinking is “pulled” by the (forgotten) question of the Being of beings, 
so why does he think about art? 
In “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger (1971) thinks about art, that is to say, he is called or pulled 
by art into the space of an “other beginning” where the Being of beings begins to be illuminated: he is 
fascinated. But the spell cast on him by art has nothing to do with the appreciation of aesthetic objects––he is 
not a connoisseur––nor is he interested in the foibles of the suffering or inspired artist played out in the endless 
psychodramas staged for the art-lover’s delectation. No, art is the place or space where “truth sets itself to 
work,” a statement that should be interpreted carefully. Heidegger is not saying that art is the truth or that art, or 
some art (authentic art), is true. Nor is he saying that the work of art is the work of truth: truth does not need art, 
it  sets  itself  to  work.  What  he  is  saying  is  that  the  work  of  truth  is  disclosed  by  art,  not  through  the 
representation of aesthetic forms, but rather as a way of seeing the “setting to work,” where seeing really means 
“heeding” or “hearkening”: a particular form of knowing encapsulated by the word technē. 
 
The word technē denotes … a mode of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means 
to apprehend what is present, as such. For Greek thought the essence of knowing consists in alētheia, that is, in the 
revealing of beings … Technē, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings it that it brings 
forth  what  is  present  as  such  out  of  concealedness  and  specifically  into  the  unconcealedness  of  their  appearance. 
(Heidegger 1971, 59) 
 
So, to begin to answer the question as to what it is about art that so fascinates, clearly there is a “call” here 
into  a  mode  of  knowing  that  is  exotic  to  the  extent  that  it  represents  a  break  with  the  hegemonic 
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will-to-knowledge which, as Nietzsche had already spotted, increasingly dogs and perverts the thinker’s task. 
But why should the unconcealment of Being be any more fascinating that the scientific verification of truth? It 
is here that one must recognise and understand the place and function of work within Heidegger’s concept of 
truth: truth is not just there, but given (Es gibt) again and again through the infinite becoming of work. It is the 
revelation of this work in and by art that draws the thinker in; not as a way of approaching the truth but, rather, 
as a way of tracking and tracing its withdrawal. Being drawn to what withdraws is the essence of fascination. 
Within the economy of knowledge truth is truth. Within the knowingness of technē “truth, in its essence, is 
untruth” (Heidegger 1971, 54). It is this irresolvable duality that demands not the familiar dialectical work that 
would  seek  to  overcome  contradiction  and  actualise  absolute  knowledge,  but  the  work  of  “dissembling” 
(Heidegger 1971, 54) that, as Blanchot describes it, incessantly reveals and re-veils. “The poem is thus the veil 
which makes the fire visible, which reveals it precisely by veiling it and concealing it. The poem shows, then; it 
discloses, but by concealing, because it detains in the dark that which can only be revealed in the light of 
darkness and keeps this mystery dark even in the light which the dark makes the first dawn of all” (Blanchot 
1982, 230). 
What does knowingness know? It knows of its own unknowingness. Misunderstanding this––described by 
Heidegger as the “denial” or “refusal” of truth by truth itself––results in a subsequent misunderstanding of the 
latter’s encounter with art, one that is evident in many (mis)interpretations of his notorious discussion of Van 
Gogh. Heidegger’s dubious politics notwithstanding, the famous passage in “The Origin of the Work of Art” 
suffers a radical distortion when it is taken merely as a proto-Nazi glorification of the blood and soil, not least 
because the very work of truth as described here precisely unravels the very certainties that make for the 
(admittedly unsavoury) political convictions attributed to Heidegger. This is the key passage: “[t]his equipment 
[the shoes] belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this 
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself …. But perhaps it is only in the picture 
that we notice all this about the shoes. The peasant woman, on the other hand, simply wears them” (Heidegger 
1971, 34). 
Certainly Heidegger’s fascination does on occasions result in some ill-judged prose, more deserving of 
ridicule than serious political opposition––“the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the 
surrounding menace of death” (Heidegger 1971, 34)––but in essence his intention is clearly the affirmation of 
art rather than the fascistic glorification of the peasant (with or without the dreaded shoes). It is, in other words, 
the knowing unknowingness of art, rather than the unadulterated ignorance of the peasant that brings our 
attention to what Heidegger describes as the “strife” of “earth” and “world,” and it is this, the co-presence of 
the open and the closed, that is at the heart of the truth-event. To properly understand this it is necessary first of 
all to strip “earth” and “world” of their fascistic connotations and grasp their philosophical purpose within the 
above passage and Heidegger’s ontological project as a whole. To repeat: the real issue here is the play of 
unconcealment and concealment and the withdrawing of truth into itself. 
 
The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical 
people. The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering 
and concealing. World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated…The world, in 
resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as 
sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there….The opposition of world and earth 
is strife. (Heidegger 1971, 48-49) 
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If, as Heidegger suggests, we only “notice” this strife in the artwork, this is not because the artist has 
arrived at an aesthetic form capable of representing and communicating the work of truth but, rather the 
contrary,  that  art  itself  withdraws  into  a  solitude  that  in  a  sense  absents  it  from  the  world  of  human 
communication and knowledge exchange. And, paradoxically, the more the work opens up an illuminated space, 
the more solitary it becomes: the overpowering presence of an untouchable absence. “The more this thrust 
comes into the open, the stronger and more solitary the work becomes…. The more solitary the work, fixed in 
the figure, stands on its own and the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does 
the thrust come into the Open” (Heidegger 1971, 66). 
Judged by the contemporary standards of “knowledge transfer” and the communicative community that 
legitimates it (and is in turn legitimated by it) neither the thinker nor the artist knows the work in any sense that 
would be socially or academically useful. The former looks on from the outside and describes the fascinating 
spectacle of the known folding into the unknown, while the latter speaks from within the essential solitude, not 
as one “in the know” but, rather, as one cast aside by the work as it dis-closes its incomprehensible truth-event. 
For both the thinker and the artist, in fact both cast aside by the work, the fascination with art can only be an 
affirmative experience: fascination cannot negate. But the peculiarity of fascination––its fascinating quality––is 
that, although devoid of negativity, it is only “pulled” into or towards art through the necessary affirmation of 
the “no” and the “don’t know.” It is this double affirmation that promotes the work to its essential solitude and 
its consequent unknowability. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The affirmation of the “no” that itself affirms the ground of the “first beginning” as it is repulsed, 
represents an affirmation of “world,” the opening of a beginning that originates the work of unconcealment 
even as that worldly beginning is leapt away from. To leap away from “world” is to leap away from knowledge 
or, to be more accurate, is the incessant repulsion of knowledge. To affirm the “other beginning” is in effect to 
say “yes” to the “don’t know,” to make the de-cision that cuts art away from knowledge and thrusts the work 
back  into  its  sheltering  concealment:  “earth.”  But  it  is  not  simply  a  question  of  affirming  one  or  the 
other––“world”  or  “earth”––with  “yeses”  that  bowdlerise  or  mystify  art  respectively,  nor  is  there  any 
suggestion here that both should be affirmed with a great big “yes” that obliterates the irreducibility of “world” 
and “earth” as well as the restlessness that keeps the work of truth (and the work of art) working. Anyway, 
fascination and choice are contradictory concepts, the fascinated do not choose to be fascinated, they are chosen 
and must decide if they wish to succumb not to “world” or “earth” but to the eternal “strife” between them. 
Clearly, Heidegger is fascinated but, as a thinker, his task is to describe what it is that fascinates. In 
particular, it is the solitude of the work and its break with the human (thanks to the “don’t know”) that draws 
him towards art as it withdraws. This break with the human, so typical of Heidegger, also draws him away from 
humanism and the existential which, on the level of philosophical thought is its real strength and value. 
However, as we have seen, this results in an obliviousness to the actuality of art practice and the experience of 
the practitioner that, while refreshing as a necessary antidote to the multitude of ghastly humanistic texts on 
“the Artist”, does nevertheless deny us any insight into the existential/aesthetic confrontation with anti-humanism. 
So it is not a question of returning to a discredited and somewhat embarrassing humanism obsessed with the 
tragedy of the subject, but, rather, of considering just how that subject/artist continues to make work not about 
solitude as with Heidegger, but from within the solitude that is art. 
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